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In  this  paper,  wee  propose  a  model  for  regulatory  capture  that  is  based  on  information 
transmission and asymmetric information. In a three- tier model, a regulator is charged by a 
political principal to provide a signal for the type of a regulated firm. Only the firm can observe 
his type and the production of a correlated signal with a given accuracy is costly for the regulator. 
The firm can costlessly provide an alternative signal of lower accuracy that is presented to the 
regulator.  In  a  self-enforcing  equilibrium,  the  regulator  transmits  the  firm-produced  signal, 
internalizes its own savings in information cost and the firm enjoys higher information rents. The 
main feature of soft capture is that it is not based on a reciprocity of favors but on a congruence of 
interests between the firm and the regulator. 
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Regulatory capture is an area that has attracted considerable attention from
both academia and, in legal and organizational contexts, from practitioners.
Generally, the notion that an agency, monitoring a sector in order to prevent
abuse of market power or to insure non-discriminatory service provision, is
unduly inuenced by same rms that it is set to supervise is per se a justied
motivation to scrutinize regulatory design.
Capture is often analyzed using a three-layer hierarchy composed of a
political principal (government), a regulatory agency and a rm. Regula-
tory capture is then a side agreement between the regulator and the rm
to act against the interests of the political principal.1 When the regulatory
environment is designed under asymmetric information, capture originates
in the combination of regulatory discretion and rents left to the rm. In Ti-
role (1986) and Laont and Tirole (1993, chapter 11), the regulator possibly
observes a signal correlated with the agent's private cost parameter. This
informative signal, if reported to the political principal, reduces the rent left
to the regulated rm. Hence, information collection is valuable and justies
the existence of a regulator as an information gathering intermediate. But,
if the regulator has some discretion when it reports information to the prin-
cipal, the rm is ready to bribe the regulator for not disclosing rent-reducing
information. Thus, the incentives and the resources of the regulatory agency
must be carefully designed to prevent this form of collusion to occur.
In most of the capture models, the rm inuences the regulatory be-
havior by a mechanism based on threats (damaged reputation) and rewards
(bribes, revolving doors); see Dal B o (2006) for a recent survey. Regula-
tory capture is normally built on an explicit or implicit collusive agreement
between the regulator and the rms. Collusion may rely on bribes2 paid
by the rm or the possibility of post-regulatory employment in a regulated
rm (revolving doors). Revolving doors may lead to pro-industry regula-
tors that are prone to leave excessive rent to the rms.3 Taking this into
1In the general setting, capture may be induced not only by the regulated rm, but
also by potential clients, sta or other stakeholders that have an interest in biasing the
outcome (see Peltzman, 1976 and Becker, 1983).
2Excluding the empirically rare 'suitcase', the rm may provide future employment or
contracts for services to rms associated with the regulator or members of his family, pro-
vide valuable private information on publicly traded assets or foreseen business projects,
real estate or other (costly) indirect transfers.
3The 'revolving door' hypothesis has weak empirical support (Freitag, 1983 and Makkai
and Braithwait, 1992). Although, 'softer' application of regulatory supervision and empa-
thy towards regulated entities are prevalent among low- and medium-level sta members
1account, the government optimally limits the regulatory discretion (Hiriart
and Martimort, 2009).
But, rms can use another channel for inuencing the regulatory out-
come: they can transmit pieces of information relevant for the decision mak-
ers. Indeed, many regulated rms nance R&D, produced in-house or by
third-parties, and disseminate the results of these studies publicly. This
knowledge can be (and actually is) used for regulatory purposes for the ben-
et of both the regulator and the rm: the rm because it controls the
content of the information and the regulator because it saves on informa-
tion gathering costs. The regulator is thus captured by accepting biased
information from the rm. We will refer to this situation as soft capture
and we believe that this form of capture is quite common in regulated in-
dustries. In highly technical sectors such as utility regulation, the regulator
may be subject to political pressure to present new regulation for specic
areas (e.g. technical quality norms, cost allocation grids, grid codes) within
a given time and budget frame. Facing the risk of professional failure if an
inadequate regulation is presented and the risk of career concerns if refusing
the task, the regulators have tendency to accept industry "input", "sector
consultations" or "cooperative development" of such regulatory projects.
Soft capture is not based on threats and rewards: both parties are better
o if the regulator rubber-stamps the information produced by the rm
instead of producing its own. The regulator comes to the political principal
with information (what the principal expected it to do). The rm, if it
transmits less precise information, increases its information rent. Hence,
capture benets both parties without requiring any form of side contracting
nor side payments between parties.
In this paper, we develop a model where, as in Laont and Tirole (1993),
the regulator is an information gathering intermediate for the political prin-
cipal. At some cost, the regulator observes a signal correlated with the
rm's unknown cost parameter. The regulator reports the signal only if it is
induced to do so and we assume that, in the absence of capture, the benets
of a better tted regulation when the signal is reported exceeds the cost of
adding an extra layer between the rm and the political power. Next, we
consider the case where the rm can substitute the regulator and produces a
signal itself. If it does so, the regulator can either report the rm's signal or
of regulatory authorities, only a small fraction seek or obtain employment in the regulated
sector. However, Makkai and Braithwait (1992) document 'situational capture' as a con-
sequence of the extra workload caused by higher incidence of detected non-compliance. In
our setting, this can be interpreted as a problem of moral hazard linked to cost of eort
in enforcement.
2its own signal if it had invested the necessary resources to produce one.4 The
rm is interested in transmitting information to the regulator only if (i) this
information will be used for regulatory purposes and (ii) this information
is less accurate than that of the regulator. We therefore consider that the
signal produced by the rm contains more noise. In our model, the signal
is 'soft' information meaning that no one can be punished if the informa-
tion is inaccurate. If the regulator is paid when it reports information, the
rm will provide a signal to the regulator to avoid that the regulator invests
resources to produce a more precise one. The regulator is softly captured
by the rm and the regulation by the political principal is based on a less
accurate information, though the cost of operating the regulatory agency is
left unchanged. Though the regulator no longer collects information, it is
the threat of a more precise information that induces the rm to disclose
biased information to the regulator. To observe this biased signal, the po-
litical principal must still appoint a regulator but the role devolved to the
regulatory agency changes from an information gathering intermediate to
an information transmission intermediate.
To benet from a more accurate information, produced by the regula-
tor, the principal must thus change its incentive package. In particular, this
would entail a decentralization of the welfare objective and a raise in the
expected payment to the regulator. Given costs in bureaucracy and incom-
plete contracting, the principal may prefer to tolerate (soft) capture of the
regulator by the rm (cf. Che, 1995).
Models based on information provision as incentive for capture are rel-
atively rare. In a stream addressing lobbying of vote-seeking political prin-
cipals, Austen-Smith and Wright (1992) present a model where two com-
peting interest groups invest in biased information transmission, subject to
the possibility of costly auditing from the principal. The results show that
the information provision is welfare increasing on average and that the pres-
ence of multiple information providers may discipline the tendency to distort
information.
1.1 Motivating examples
To motivate the model, we provide an extreme example from US regulation
and two recent examples from European utility regulation.
4In our model, the regulator is the sole source of information for the political principal.
Dual sourcing of information, for instance lobbying by the rm and reporting by the
regulator, is not considered here. See Laont and Martimort (1998) on this point.
3The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is respon-
sible for the regulation, monitoring and enforcement of workplace health
and safety in the USA under Occupational Safety and Health Act (1970).
Seen as an aggressive action against private industry, the agency has been
continuously target of resource deprivation since its foundation.5 Covering
a vast domain of regulation, OSHA is de facto applying regulation using
"national consensus standards", developed by "trade or professional associ-
ations for the practices, systems, processes, or raw materials of their mem-
bers"(Hamilton, note 13, 1978). The resulting enforcement record of OSHA
is dismal6 due to inappropriate regulatory design. The industry-inspired
regulations are found to systematically overestimate the costs of regulatory
impact in a number of industrial sectors7, potentially to provide the agency
with politically viable arguments to justify the regulation. OSHA can be
seen as an example where the regulatory agency develops from an infor-
mation production intermediary to primarily monitoring in a mechanism
based on 'voluntary' or 'self-regulation' by the regulated rms (Shapiro and
Rabinowitz, 2000).
The European sectorial energy regulation has wide economic, technical
and judicial consequences for the rms and the nal consumers. The reg-
ulatory framework in Europe under the Third Directive (EC 2009/72/EC
and 2009/73/EC) is based on national implementations, monitored by in-
dependent national regulatory authorities (NRA), loosely coordinated by a
community agency (Agency for the Coordination of European Energy Regu-
lators, ACER). The nancial and human resources of the NRAs widely vary,
limiting their possibilities to undertake independent information gathering.
5E.g., in the period 1971-2004, the number of US employed under regulation doubled
from 58 million to 115 million while the agency's sta decreased from 2,300 employees to
2,100 employees, in addition to continuous budget cuts in real and nominal terms since
1980 (OHSA, 2010).
6The OSHA regulations are extremely dicult to enforce: from 85.539 safety violations
in 2003, only 404 were considered 'willful' and eligible for the highest criminal sanctions
(Barstow, 2003). The outcome is striking: from a reported 2,197 workplace fatalities in
1982-2002, 1,242 were investigated by OSHA, thereof nally referring 119 cases for legal
prosecution, resulting in nine convictions to prison for the employer. Most investigations
were dropped already at reporting, the rest from ambiguities in the regulation (Barstow,
2003).
7E.g. Vinyl Chloride (Oct 4, 1974, 39 FR 35890), OSHA relied on industry consultants'
estimate of 1,000 M$ in compliance costs. Actual spending in equipment, and incremental
operating cost is around 228 - 278 M$. (US Congress, 1995). The report documents
similar ndings for the exposure regulations for cotton dust, lead, ethylene oxide and
formaldehyde, as well as for the operating regulations for grain handling, mechanical
power presses and powered platforms for building maintenance.
4The information processing costs are substantial from most NRAs, with up
to 800 regulated rms subject to heterogenous technical and economic con-
ditions, each subject to an ex ante tari regulation based on a number of
veriable principles.
The regulated sector, on the other hand, enjoys resources for information
provision far larger than the NRA, with eective coordination also at com-
munity level in organs such as Eurelectric and ENTSO-E (EC 714/2009, art
5). One mission of primary importance for the functioning of the integrated
electricity market is the development of a common standard (code) for all
connecting transmission grids (EC 714/2009, art 6). Figuring as a mission
and competence of ACER (EC 733/2009, art 6), the development of the
network code is de facto made by the operators' organ ENTSO-E, starting
their activities July 1, 2009 whereas the competent regulatory authority is
planned to start their activities in March 2011. The editing of later docu-
ments reects this change in initiative, where the regulated entities invest
to propose their own detailed regulation, pre-emptying the regulatory au-
thority by initiative and resources. Parallel initiatives of the same type are
made for integrated market design and system operations.
A third example is found in the development of quality regulation for
electricity distribution in Sweden. The Swedish NRA regulates 180 electric-
ity distributors providing ve million households under heterogenous tech-
nical delivery conditions, asset bases and customer proles. Deregulated in
1996, the government explicitly prompted the NRA also to provide regu-
lation for service quality (Swedish Government, 2001). However, in 2001
the NRA endorsed a detailed voluntary service regulation with repayments
for interruptions, developed by the sector association Svensk Energi. In op-
eration until 2006, when again urged by Parliament to issue independent
regulation, the nal proposal (STEM, 2005) draws on the structure and
amounts stipulated in the industry regulation.
2 The model and benchmark results
We consider a three-tier hierarchy composed of a political principal (P), a
regulatory agency (R) and regulated rm (F).
The regulated rm produces a good in quantity q at a constant marginal
cost . The cost parameter is the rm's private information but it is common
knowledge that  2 f; g, with  =     > 0 and Pr( = ) = . The
rm signs a contract with the political principal that species a production
5level q and a transfer t. The rm's utility is
U = t   q;
with its reservation level normalized to zero.
The regulatory agency is an information gathering intermediate, whose
main task consists in producing a signal for the principal. The signal is
a piece of information correlated with the rm's hidden cost parameter.
Analogous to the cost parameter ; the signal is a binary variable  2
f1;2g with the conditional probabilities of the realizations Pr( = 1j =
) =  and Pr( = 2j = ) = . Signals are informative when  > 1
2
where  can be interpreted as a measure of the informativeness or quality
of the signal i.e. a higher  means a higher correlation between the true type
 and the signal . When  = 1, signal and type are perfectly correlated
while  = 1
2, signies a white noise.
Producing a signal is costly for the regulator; it must incur a cost m > 0
to produce a signal of quality R > 1
2. We assume that the signal is non-
veriable, which means that it cannot be included in the contract between
the rm and the principal. However, the potential disclosure of informa-
tion by the regulator is observable and the regulator's compensation can be
made contingent on that.8 The political principal cannot thus not verify the
quality of an assessment, but only its existence. Conditional on submitting
a signal, the regulator receives a payment w and its utility is
V = w   m:
The regulator has a reservation utility of zero and it is protected by limited
liability.
The political principal remains in charge of the main regulatory tasks and
designs a regulatory contract (t;q) for the rm after observing the signal .
When the quality of the observed signal is   1
2, after observing i, i = 1;2,
the principal revises its beliefs on the rm's private cost parameter to:
1() = Pr( = j1) =

 + (1   )(1   )
 
or
2() = Pr( = j2) =
(1   )
(1   ) + (1   )
 :
8Examples could be cost, impact or eciency studies performed by or for the regulator
and included in annual reports or preambles to regulatory rulings.
6When the rm produces a quantity q, the value for the principal of these
q units is S(q) with S0 > 0, S00 < 0 and S(0) = 0. The principal's net
surplus9, W, is dened as
W = S(q)   t   w:
The timing of the events is as follows:
t = 0
 The rm learns its private cost parameter .
t = 1
 The political principal oers a contract (w) to the regulator.
 The regulator potentially produces a signal  at cost m.
t = 2
 The political principal observes i (if produced) and oers a contract
(t;q) to the rm.
 The rm accepts or rejects the contract.
The model presented in this section and the associated results are per-
fectly standard (see for example Laont and Martimort, 2002, chapter 2).
2.1 Benchmark results in the absence of capture
At t = 1, the principal can oer two possible contracts to the regulator:
either it oers a contract w = m and the regulator produces a signal of
quality R or it oers w = 0 and the regulator does not invest in information
acquisition to produce the signal. Equivalently, we can consider that, in
the latter case, the principal observes a noisy signal with quality  = 1
2.
Then, we can parametrize the optimal date-2 contract as a function of 
and afterwards compare the two options: a signal of quality R at a cost of
m or a signal of quality  = 1
2 for free.
At t = 2, after observing i; i = 1;2, the principal oers the rm a menu
of contracts f(t;q);(t;q)g. Such a menu is incentive feasible if it satises the
9We assume that the political principal attributes no value to the utility of the regu-
lator, a conventional assumption.
7ecient rm's incentive compatibility constraint and the inecient rm's
individual rationality constraint:
t   q  t   q; (1)
t   q  0: (2)
The other two constraints, individual rationality for the ecient rm and





i()(S(q)   t) + (1   i())(S(q)   t)
subject to (1) and (2).
The optimal contract oered to the rm after observing the signal i
satises:
S0(q
i()) =  (3)





i + qi (5)
ti() = qi (6)
This contract is standard.
Now let's turn to the choice of the principal at date 1. If it pays the reg-
ulator w = m, the latter produces a signal of quality R and the principal's
expected surplus (at date-1) is
EW(R) = [R(S(q
1(R))   t1(R)) + (1   R)(S(q
2(R))   t2(R))]
+(1   )[R(S(q2(R))   t2(R)) + (1   R)(S(q1(R))   t1(R))]   m (7)


















Adding a tier between the political principal and the rm is socially
valuable whenever EW(R) EW(1
2)  0. Given that EW() is increasing
in , we have
8Lemma 1 There exists ~ 1 > 1
2 such that if R  ~ 1, the principal sets
w = m and the regulator produces a signal; otherwise it sets w = 0 and does
not observe any informative signal.
The principal employs a regulator when the gains from a more accurate
information on the rm's cost parameter exceeds the cost of gathering infor-
mation. For the remaining of the analysis, we will assume that it is indeed
the case: ~ 1 < R  1.
Finally notice that when the signal's quality is , the ecient rm's
expected utility is:
EU() = q1() + (1   )q2() (9)
and that this expression is decreasing in . Hence, a more accurate infor-
mation reduces the expected rent left to the rm.
3 Capture
3.1 The scope for capture
The mechanism above is not immune to capture when the rm can substi-
tute the regulator and produce a signal  by itself. Suppose that, at no
cost, the rm is able to produce a signal that is less informative than the
signal produced by the regulator. More precisely, let us denote by F the
informativeness of the rm's produced signal with 1
2  F < R. Examples
could be found in the use of methodologies, models and data collection rou-
tines that provide results that are more favorable to the rm. If the rm
transmits such information to the regulator, both the rm and the regulator
are better o. Indeed, the regulator can transmit the signal to the political
principal, receiving the payment w = m since the principal cannot distin-
guish the origin or precision of the signal. Given that the production cost is
lower, the regulator's utility is strictly higher: V = m. The rm also ben-
ets from providing the signal to the regulator. The lower accuracy in the
signal provides the ecient rm with a higher expected information rent.10
For instance, if the political principal is fooled and believes that it re-
ceives a piece of information made by the regulatory agency, the expected
10The rent of the inecient rm is, in any case, equal to zero. Thus, if producing a
signal is costly for the rm, only the ecient rm would produce it provided that the cost
exceeds the benet (given by (10)). Considering costly signals would not qualitatively
change the results.
9rent of the ecient rm increases by
Fq1(R) + (1   F)q2(R) > EU(R): (10)
This self-enforcing capture is obviously detrimental to the political principal
and hurts welfare.
If the regulator fools the political principal and transmits the rm's
produced signal,
The implicit collusion between the rm and the regulator above is in
contrast with other models of collusion in three-tier hierarchies (Tirole, 1986,
Laont and Tirole, 1993, chapter 11, Kofman and Lawaree, 1993) where side
contracting and side payments (or some form of reciprocity) are necessary
conditions for collusion. In these latter models, the rm should bribe the
regulator for not disclosing information that is valuable to the principal but
detrimental to the rm. In our set-up, the rm does not need to bribe
the regulator.11 The rm produces and transmits noisy information to the
regulator who is free to use it as it wishes. It turns out that, if producing
acquisition is costly and if the information quality cannot be veried, both
the rm and the regulator are better o if the regulator transmits the rm's
less precise signal. Thus, there is no need of an explicit agreement to support
collusion.
In practice, there are many channels that the rm can use to disclose
(biased) information to the regulator.12 Firms can produce their own re-
search, data collection and analyses or nance third parties (consultants,
researchers, universities,...). These studies or research reports, produced or
sponsored by rms, may be disseminated through professional forums, con-
ferences or published as reports. In the case of OSHA above, the rms sub-
mit the information formatted as proposed regulation, including all technical
details. Firms can also train regulatory stas and make available their spe-
cial eld expertise. All these practices are commonly observed, for instance
in the eld of utility regulation, and there is no doubt that the information
emanating from the rm percolates throughout the regulators.
Majone (1997) announces the information-based regulation the new modus
11In fact, our model predicts the opposite practice. Under the mild assumption that
monetary corruption would leave some observable trace that could be used to exert pres-
sure on the regulator, it is easy to see that the payment of bribes would not be part of a
dominant strategy for our game.
12In fact, agencies sometimes actively solicit data from (likely biased) sources: "I am
actually surprised how often they [ministerial civil servants] ring me up looking for data
I would have assumed they should be the ones who have it." (Interview with lobbyist,
Bernhagen and Br auninger, 2005, p. 47)
10operandi for the European regulatory agencies, less armed by formal enforce-
ment rights. Our model is indeed a simple example how information access,
production and asymmetry interplay to create a socially costly collusion
between industry and regulators. We call this practice soft capture: self-
enforcing and undetectable, its apparent lack of commitment is deceptive.
The main feature of soft capture is that it is not based on a reciprocity of
favors but on a congruence of interests between the rm and the regulator.
Taking this phenomenon into account, the political principal has three
options. First, it may refrain from using the information gathering expertise
of the regulator and to design the regulatory contract on the basis of its prior
knowledge of the rm's cost. Second, it may continue to exploit the infor-
mation produced by the rm, i.e., accept the regulator to be softly captured
by the rm, but changing its interpretation of the information transmitted.
Third, it may design and implement a collusion-proof mechanism. In this
latter case, the political principal incentivizes the regulator only to transmit
high quality and to balk biased signals. Unfortunately, the threat of capture
raises the cost of this mechanism for the principal.
We have already described the mechanism in the absence of a regulator,
the associated expected welfare is EW(1
2). Without the threat of capture,
this solution is always dominated (by assumption) but, as we will see, this
may longer be the case when capture can take place. Below, we model and
evaluate the three options for the regulator.
3.2 Soft capture: The rm produces the signal
Consider the case in which the political principal uses the rm-produced
signal for designing the regulatory contract. The rm and the regulator
engage in the soft collusion described above.
Even if the rm produces the information for free and is ready to trans-
mit it to the regulator, the political principal must still pay w = m to
the regulator to obtain any information. Indeed, if w < m, the regulator
has no incentives to produce the signal in the case it would not have been
transmitted by the rm. Given that any information about its type would
make the rm strictly worse o, the rm will never transmit a signal to the
regulator when it is the sole source of information. When the threat of an
independently produced signal is absent, the rm has no incentive to dis-
close information at all. Hence, to benet from the rm's produced signal,
the principal must pay w = m to the regulator, conditionally on reporting
a signal. This nicely illustrates the rational behind soft capture. It is the
threat of a more informative message that motivates the rm to disclose less
11precise information. Should this threat disappear, the rm will no longer
produce information.13
With w = m, the signal transmitted by the regulator is produced by the
rm. Taking that into account, after observing a i, the principal revises
his beliefs to i(F). The optimal contract is given by (3) to (6) for  = F
and the corresponding expected welfare is equal to:
EW(F) = [F(S(q
1(F))   t1(F)) + (1   F)(S(q
2(F))   t2(F))]
+(1   )[F(S(q2(F))   t2(F)) + (1   F)(S(q1(F))   t1(F))]   m(11)
This welfare is obviously lower than EW(R).
3.3 Collusion-proof: The regulator produces the signal
With a wage equal to the signal's production cost, the regulator transmits
the noisy information obtained from the rm. In order to have a more
informative signal, produced by the regulator, the political principal must
adapt the contract oered to the regulatory agency. In particular, both the
level and structure of the compensation should be changed. Clearly enough,
the payment can no longer be conditional on the submission of a signal
since, in this case, the regulator reports the signal produced by the rm.
The payment should be made contingent on the regulatory outcome and
in particular on the transfer paid to the rm, in such a way that, when a
better information leads to a more ecient regulatory contract, part of the
welfare gain is internalized by the regulator. The political principal must
thus partially decentralize its objective to the regulator.
As already mentioned, the ecient rm is strictly worse-o when the
regulator gathers information itself. Consequently, we must take into ac-
count that the rm is ready to bribe the regulator for not doing so (as in
the standard models of collusion such as Laont and Tirole, 1993). In con-
trast with the soft capture case, the rm and the regulator must engage in
side-contracting if they want to collude against the interests of the principal.
A side contract species the bribe paid by the rm to the regulator if the
latter does not produce the signal and discloses, instead, the rm's produced
signal.14
13This eect is analogous to the results obtained in lobbying models (Cf. Austen-Smith
and Wright, 1992): a lobbyist would only invest in costly information acquisition provided
the [regulator] enjoys a suciently low cost of independent information acquisition, or else
the message would be discarded by default as non-informative.
14Whether the regulator discloses or not a signal is a veriable outcome. The political
12Only the ecient rm with type  is ready to bribe the regulator. The
ecient rm' potential gain from collusion is given by (10). The rm is ready
to pay up to (R F)[q2(R) q1(R)] to the regulator if the latter uses
the signal the former produces. Let us assume that side contracting between
the regulator and the rm is costly and denote by k  1 the transaction cost
of side contracting. When the rm transmits 1$ to the regulator, the latter
has k$ in its pockets.15
At t = 1, when the principal designs the contract for the regulatory
agency, it must take into account that, with probability , the regulator
faces an ecient rm that is ready to bribe the regulator for not producing
a signal. Thus, for a collusion-proof contract, the principal must take into
account that the regulator's utility under collusion is
V 0 = k(R   F)[q2(R)   q1(R)]: (12)
A more precise signal makes the transfers t1 and t2 more likely and t2
and t1 less likely. To induce information acquisition by the regulator, the
principal must thus reward the regulator when t 2 ft1;t2g. Let us denote by
w(t), the wage paid to the regulator contingently on a transfer t to the rm.
Assume further that the regulator is protected by limited liability, w(t)  0,
the regulator's incentive constraint writes as follows:
(R   F)[(w(t1)   w(t2)) + (1   )(w(t2)   w(t1))]  m + V 0 (13)
The left hand side of (13) is the extra wage received when the signal has a
quality R instead of F. The right hand side is the cost of producing a high
quality signal including the opportunity cost of renouncing to the bribe.
At equilibrium, (13) is binding and the expected payment to the regula-
tor for a high quality signal is equal to
~ w =
m + V 0
R   F =
m
R   F + k[q2(R)   q1(R)]: (14)
Clearly enough, the possibility of capture inates the expected compensation
paid to the regulatory agency for producing a high quality signal: ~ w > m.
Notice that the contract with the regulator w(t) is designed prior the
regulatory contract (q;t). Then, commitment to the regulatory contract
principal can thus put pressures on the regulator for providing him with information,
for instance by not reappointing a failing regulator. Should this threat be eective, the
principal can avoid that the rm pays the regulator for not disclosing information at all.
The concern of the principal is thus to prevent that the rm bribes the regulator for
disclosing an information that the former produced.
15On the foundations of the transactions costs of side contracting, see Martimort (1999).
13(ti;q
i;ti;qi) after observing i might be a concern. By deviating to ti+, the
principal saves on the regulator's wage w(ti). Commitment to the optimal
regulatory contract requires that the regulator species a suciently large
wage w(t) for out-of-equilibrium values of t = 2 ft1;t2;t1;t2g. Given that, the
optimal date-2 contract with the rm are given by (3) to (6) for  = R.
The welfare with the collusion-proof contract is:
EW(R)  
m
R   F   k[q2(R)   q1(R)]: (15)
3.4 Comparisons
At t = 1, the political principal's choice of a contract with the regulator will
be driven by the comparison of (8), (11) and (15). We have:
Lemma 2 There exists ~ 2 > ~ 1 such that (i) if R  ~ 2, EW(R)   ~ w 
EW(1
2) and (ii) d~ 2=dF > 0.
Proof: Part (i) follows from the fact that ~ w > m; Part (ii) from the fact
that d ~ w=dF > 0.
Notice that our assumptions do not guarantee that ~ 2 < 1. If this condi-
tion does not hold true, the collusion proof mechanism is always dominated
by direct regulation by the political principal. This might happen when the
agency cost of incentivizing the regulator becomes prohibitive compared to
its informational benet.
Lemma 3 There exists ~ 3 such that (i) if R  ~ 3, EW(R)   ~ w 
EW(F), (ii) ~ 3 > F and (iii) d~ 3=dF > 0.
Proof: If R is large enough, then d(EW(R)  ~ w)=dR > 0 which implies
(i). Part (ii) follows from the fact that limR!F EW(R)  ~ w < EW(F);
Part (iii) from the facts that dEW(F)=dF > 0 and d ~ w=dF > 0.
Likewise, our assumptions do not guarantee that ~ 3 < 1. This lemma
establishes that when the quality of the rm produced signal is suciently
close to the quality of the regulatory produced signal, the agency cost of
information acquisition becomes prohibitive and the political principal is
better o if it only induces the regulator to transmits information.
From our three lemmas, it follows that:
Proposition 1 The political principal tolerates soft capture of the regulator
when F  ~ 1 and R  ~ 3. Under our assumptions, this parameter set is
non-empty.
14As in Che (1995), the principal accepts the regulator to be softly cap-
tured by the rm in equilibrium when the cost of ghting collusion exceeds
the benets of improved regulatory power. This happens when the accu-
racy of the rm produced information is high enough in absolute terms and
relative to the accuracy of the regulator's own-produced signal.
Proposition 1 is illustrated in gure 1 (assuming ~ 2; ~ 3 < 1). Absent
the threat of capture, the political principal appoints a regulator whenever
R  ~ 1 (regions I, II and III in gure 1). When capture is taken into
account, the principal no longer uses a regulator in region I: the rm's sig-
nal is too much biased and the regulator's signal is not accurate enough to
justify the extra cost of an intermediate layer in the hierarchy. In region II,
the political principal tolerates soft capture by the rm i.e. the regulator's
mission changes and it is no longer used as an information collection inter-
mediate. Finally, in region III, the political principal actively ght collusion
by decentralizing its objective to the regulator (at some extra cost) and the











































Figure 1: Regulatory regimes.
3.5 Discussion
The mechanism of soft capture is based on the threat of having informa-
tion produced (at some cost) by the regulator. The rm who is hurt by
information is ready to supply less accurate information for free.
In our model, we have so far considered as exogenous the accuracy of the
signals produced by the rm and the regulator. In this section, we discuss
briey the implications of endogenous information quality. Clearly enough,
15if the rm can choose the bias contained in its signal, it will set F at a level
that leads to the less informative regulatory regime. Referring to gure 1,
the rm's preferred accuracy F is equal to Max[~ 1   ; ~ 3 + ]. By doing
so, the rm can escape the toughest regulatory regime and preserve higher
information rents.
If R  ~ 2(~ 1), by choosing a low accuracy for its information, the
rm will be directly regulated by the political principal who no longer uses
the expertise of the regulator. If R  ~ 2(~ 1) and if the rm provides a
suciently precise signal (F > ~ 3), the political principal tolerates soft
capture. When the rm provides suciently reliable information, the rents
saved by the political principal when the signal is less noisy do not exceed
the extra cost of producing such a signal.
But the political principal can use the fact that the rm is ready to
supply suciently accurate information to avoid toughest regulation. The
quality of information the rm is ready to provide increases with the threat
exerted by the regulator. Should the regulator be able to produce very
precise information on the rm's cost, then the signal produced by the rm
will be precise too. Conversely, should the regulator have little competency
in information gathering, the rm will transmit very noisy information, if at
all. The accuracy of the rm's signal is thus correlated with the accuracy
of the regulator's signal. So, even if the political principal tolerates soft
capture at equilibrium (due to high incentive costs), it is important that
regulators are endowed with a suciently high expertise. Firms are thus
induced to transmit higher quality information if they want to short-circuit
the regulatory process.
Soft capture is based on the threat of regulatory investigation and, the
stronger the threat (a more accurate signal), the more informative will be the
rm's produced signal. Regulatory resources and expertise keep a central
role even if, at equilibrium, the political principal let the rm produces its
own information.
4 Conclusions
Accepting the conjecture that capture indeed exists and inuences public
authority decision making and enforcement of economic regulations, the
critical question is to nd its intrinsic motivational functions in order to
address it adequately. Prior literature is primarily based on the hypotheses
that regulators are driven by private monetary opportunism in the sense of
rent appropriation, leading to remedies where collusive outcomes or 'bribes'
16are thwarted by delegation of the social welfare objective to the regulator.
However, both the precondition and the remedy are relatively rare in em-
pirical work from the Western hemisphere, although economic regulation is
omnipresent. Although incidents of outright corruption of sta at regula-
tory agencies are reported, most agencies employ civil servants with origins
and future in public service, exercising only limited discretionary power and
subject to restrictions of due process and transparency. Still, many regula-
tory rulings, albeit motivated, are clearly biased in favor of the regulated
entities. Our model oers one explanation to this apparent paradox by 'soft
capture', where the rm acts as a co-producer of information for the regu-
lator, without imposing any agreement on the sharing of benets from the
side of the rm, nor commitment to use the information from the side of the
regulator. The resulting outcome is 'soft' in the sense that it is voluntary,
quality-adjusted and exible to the type of information and the abilities of
the regulator to produce equivalent information. Indeed, the political prin-
cipal accepts this capture in equilibrium for the case where the information
submitted by the rm is of suciently high quality not to justify further
investments in independent information acquisition. In a context of stricter
budget balancing for governmental agencies, scal competition among rms
and countries and pressure for technically detailed regulation in e.g. utility
regulation, one may plausibly expect soft capture to be at work.
The ndings in this work are not limited to the pure moral hazard setting
for an eort-averse regulator. They can also be interpreted as an alternative
explication for the 'revolving door' phenomenon in capture, based on the
idea on 'minimum squawk' (Leaver, 2002). Leaver (2002) nds a evidence
for correlation between falling propensity of regulators to open rate-reviews
in the case of observed cost decreases (i.e. rent extraction) and reductions
in the term limits of the regulator (i.e. reappointment stress). The model
in Leaver (2002) is based on a signaling behavior, where the regulator takes
a risk to reveal its true type only by a 'tough' decision, since the rm would
then threaten to announce the quality of the decision ('squawk'). The em-
pirical ndings from US State Public Utility Commissions' suggest that less
able regulators set more generous price caps when terms are shorter and that
rms earn higher rents when regulators serve short-term mandates. Com-
paring the 'squawk' with the pre-decision signal in our model and the cost
of information as a decreasing function of the time allocated, the outcome
is consistent and conrm the intuition. The regulator presented with con-
vincing, yet biased information on a given decision, prior to undertaking an
investment in information acquisition, may hypothesize that the rm will
carefully scrutinize, oppose and appeal any decision that is not consistent
17with the information provided. The cost of providing an information signal
of the same or higher quality as that of the rm may be prohibitive in the
short run and the risk of subsequent failure great for the regulator if faced
by a renewal or career decision. Thus, one interpretation may be that the
information provision protects the regulator from two concerns: the political
principal's potential audit of the basis for the regulatory enforcement and
the rm's legitimate review of the technical quality of the rulings to which
it is subject.
Contrasting the OSHA scenario with our qualitative ndings yields sev-
eral interesting comments. First, the regulator OSHA has in fact trans-
formed its internal resources from technical analyses to site inspections (al-
though the absolute frequency has dropped proportionally), meaning that
it maintains only an "analyst in being" as a threat, rather than perform-
ing parallel editing of standards, which is politically and economically risky
(depending on the preferences of the federal administration in charge). How-
ever, indications (US Congress, 1995) about the accuracy of industry studies
over time seem to suggest that the discrepancy actually decreases over time,
perhaps due to internalized long-term eects of disavowal of the matter of
regulation by the regulator itself, attributing it to the regulated sector it-
self. Nevertheless, we nd a direct analogy in that the detailed information
is provided for free, that (some) political assurance is included in the in-
formation transmission and in that the increased production of information
(i.e. drastic reduction of politically visible site inspections and increases in
politically risky industry conicts) is associated with high opportunity costs.
Capture of regulatory agencies, or information gathering intermediaries in
general, is a composite phenomenon that empirically may be the result of
a number of the explanatory factors proposed in the literature (monetary
bribes, revolving doors, political reputation and prestige, etc.), in addition
to, or in combination with, the relatively intuitive eort-resource motivation
that we advance in this work. Consequently, further empirical work based
on specic sectors, countries and legislations may be necessary to derive reli-
able policy results that surpass the general guidelines found in contemporary
work on good governance. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that the
simple "benchmarks" related to regulatory endowments as a proxy of regu-
latory empowerment should be enriched with supplementary analyses of the
actual decision-making basis used by the regulators.
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